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Abstract: Plato’s Gorgias sets out to discuss the nature 
and aim of rhetoric. The dialogue was held in high esteem 
among late ancient Platonists and it resurfaced in Renais-
sance discussions about ethics. Olympiodorus (6th cen-
tury) produced an extensive commentary on the dialogue, 
emphasising its ethical content. In 1409, Leonardo Bruni 
(1369-1444) provided the first complete Latin translation 
of the Gorgias with preface and annotations. Later in the 
Renaissance we find direct and indirect commentaries by 
George of Trebizond (1395-1472/1473) and Marsilio Fi-
cino (1433-1499). I argue that Ficino’s translation of, and 
commentary to, Plato’s Gorgias was a significant, but 
perhaps also unintended, contribution to the dissemination 
of ancient sophists in the Italian Renaissance. Ficino’s 
commentary to the Gorgias defends a legitimate and 
philosophical use of rhetoric, including the one we find in 
Plato’s own writings. Furthermore, Ficino treats the char-
acter Callicles – together with several other sophists in 
Plato’s dialogues – as an enemy of the Platonic-
Pythagorean ethical ideal, maintaining that the sophists 
were wrong. Moreover, he treats ancient sophists as a 
fairly homogeneous group, unlike some of the ancient 
sources. 
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1. Ficino and Renaissance sophistry 
 
This article examines the Florentine humanist and phi-
losopher Marsilio Ficino and his contribution to Renais-
sance sophistry. At first sight this may appear as an un-
promising topic, since Ficino, an important Plato transla-
tor and Platonist, generally sided with Plato in his criti-
cism of ancient sophistry: How could Ficino possibly 
have made a contribution to Renaissance sophistry?  
 The writings of ancient Greek sophists were lost in 
antiquity, and their ideas were mainly known through re-
ports made by a variety of ancient authors. Plato was one 
of these authors, and he was the most important one, since 
he portrayed several sophists and their ideas in a series of 
his dialogues. As is well known, Plato did not do so in 
order to provide a detailed and objective account of the 
sophists’ ideas, but in order to refute their ideas. Hence 
we have good reasons for believing that his account was 
biased.  
 To the Medieval Latin tradition, Plato’s works were 
inaccessible with the exception of his Timaeus (up till 
53b), which was available in Latin throughout the Medi-
eval period. His Meno, Phaedo and his Parmenides were 
translated in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, but, 
apart from the Meno, none of the dialogues conveyed 
much about ancient sophists. In the Timaeus we find the 
speaker Critias, whose relation to the speaker with the 
same name in the Plato dialogue entitled Critias is dis-
puted, but the central point is that Critias in the Timaeus 
did not convey theories under the banner of sophistry.1 In 
Meno 93c, Meno had related that sophists (sophistai) 
promised to teach virtue (aretē), adding that he admired 
Gorgias (probably a reference to Gorgias of Leontini), for 
his refusal to make such a promise; all he did was to teach 
oratory. Gorgias of Leontini (485-380) was a historical 
figure, who went to Athens on a diplomatic mission in 
427, and Plato’s Gorgias was clearly a reaction to his in-
fluence on Athenian rhetoric and politics.2 In Meno 75e, 
Socrates had referred to Prodicus, but without linking his 
name to the sophists. In short, in the Medieval period 
there was no Plato dialogue available in Latin in which a 
sophist featured as a speaker, incarnating and articulating 
sophistic theories and arguments in a elaborate manner. 
This situation meant that little, apart from names and brief 
assertions, were known about the ancient Greek sophists 
in the Medieval period through the texts of Plato, the 
chief exponent of ancient Greek sophists.  
 It should be noted, however, that even though Plato’s 
dialogues offered the most elaborate (though biased) ac-
count of ancient sophists and sophistry available to pos-
terity, non-Platonic accounts of ancient sophists and soph-
istry existed in antiquity, and some of these were trans-
mitted to the Latin Medieval tradition well before Fi-
cino’s 1484 translation of Plato’s works. Notably, Aris-
totle had dealt with sophistry and sophisms in his logical 
as well as in his non-logical works, and these works had 
been available in Latin translation for several centuries 
before Ficino’s Plato translation came out.3 It should be 
observed, however, that Aristotle rarely referred to indi-
vidual sophists, so even though Medieval, Latin transla-
tions of Aristotle’s works proceeded Ficino’s Latin trans-
lation of Plato’s dialogues and letters, these translations of 
Aristotle’s works conveyed very little about the ancient 
sophists themselves, implying that to Medieval authors 
the ‘sophist’ was a virtually empty category, whereas 
‘sophistry’ and ‘sophism’ denoted fairly well-known 
logical categories. Albert the Great (ca. 1200-1280), for 
instance, was familiar with the sophist name Gorgias 
through Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations (183b37), 
where Aristotle had criticised Gorgias for not conveying 
the art (technē) of rhetoric itself to his pupils, only its re-
sults; Albert’s knowledge about Gorgias did not transcend 
these and other scattered notes found in Aristotle’s work.4 
 There is, however, another important source to an-
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cient sophists that pre-dated Ficino’s Latin translation of 
1484, namely ancient doxographer Diogenes Laertius. In 
1433, the Florentine humanist Ambrogio Traversari com-
pleted a Latin translation of Laertius’ Lives, which subse-
quently circulated in manuscript form before it was 
printed in Rome in 1472. In general, this work became a 
major source of information of ancient Greek philosophy 
in the Renaissance, but it was almost silent as regards the 
ancient sophists. In 9.50-56, Laertius presented a short 
entry on the life of one prominent ancient sophists, 
namely Protagoras. In  8.58, in the section on Empedo-
cles, he made a brief note on another ancient sophist, 
Gorgias of Leontini: Laertius claimed that Gorgias was a 
pupil (mathētēs) of Empedocles, an accomplished orator, 
and the author of a manual on the art of rhetoric.5  
 In 1484 Ficino published the collected works of Plato, 
containing a number of dialogues portraying some of the 
most influential ancient sophists. Given the restricted 
knowledge about sophists in the medieval period, this was 
a major event. We normally think of Ficino as the one 
who transmitted Plato’s ideas to the Latin tradition, but 
we should reckon that by doing so Ficino also played an 
important role in the transmission of ancient sophistry.  
Ficino did so by providing Latin translations of Plato’s 
dialogues discussing sophists and by writing commen-
taries to these dialogues — commentaries, that were 
printed together with the dialogues themselves in the 
1484 publication and in many subsequent publications of 
Plato’s collected works. Even though Ficino by and large 
sided with Plato in his rejection of the sophists, he inad-
vertently promoted their ideas in the Renaissance. For this 
reason I think Ficino’s translations of, and especially his 
commentaries to, Plato’s dialogues on the sophists is a 
promising topic, if we want to understand the uses of the 
ancient sophists in the Renaissance. It may be useful to 
clarify the historiographical concept of sophists before I 
examine Ficino’s discussion of ancient sophists. 
 
 
2. Who counted as sophists to Ficino? 
 
Who should be included in the group of ancient sophists, 
and can one legitimately speak of them as one unified 
group?6 This is an acute problem in modern scholarship 
dedicated to ancient Greek sophistry, but it is also a prob-
lem when dealing with Ficino’s stance towards the soph-
ists as they were presented in Plato’s dialogues. As re-
gards the first question — who should we count as soph-
ists — we may, at least for a start, consult the 1952 list in 
Diels-Kranz’ sixth edition of their Fragmente der Vorsok-
ratkier, section D, entitled Ältere Sophistik’.7 Their list 
includes the following early Greek sophists: Protagoras, 
Xeniades, Gorgias, Lykophron, Prodicus, Thrasymachus, 
Hippias, Antiphon, Critias and the anonymous Iam-
blichus. We should be aware, however, that Diels-Kranz’ 
list is premised on historiographical assumptions that can 
be debated, and that the identification of the group among 
ancient Greek and Latin authors was a contentious issue. 
Given this situation, combined with our limited know-
ledge about the reception and interpretation of ancient 
sophists in the Renaissance, I prefer to be cautious and to 
refrain from establishing a list of ancient thinkers per-
ceived as sophists in the Renaissance. To Renaissance 
authors, including Ficino, the tag ‘sophist’ denoted a bat-
tle field rather than a well-defined profession. For this 
reason my second question — were ancient sophists a 
unified group – becomes even harder to answer, and I 
shall leave it open.  
 The present article is on Ficino’s commentary on 
Plato’s Gorgias. Was the protagonist Gorgias regarded as 
a sophist by Plato and Ficino? Let me first turn to Plato. 
In his Gorgias, the character Gorgias presents himself not 
as a ‘sophist’ but as an orator (rhētōr) (449a6) mastering 
rhetoric (rhētorikē), whose status as a craft (technē) is 
subsequently contested by Socrates. The fact that Plato 
has Gorgias presenting himself as an “orator” (rhētōr) 
does not exclude, of course, that he is regarded as a soph-
ist in other of Plato’s dialogues. Besides, the orator and 
the sophist may well co-exist in one person. This possi-
bility is affirmed in some of Plato’s other dialogues. In 
the Apology 19e, Socrates groups Gorgias of Leontini to-
gether with other sophists (sophistai) like Prodicus of 
Ceos and Hippias of Elis: They were itinerant teachers of 
young people. In the Meno 95c, Meno asserts that Gorgias 
differs from (other) sophists by not promising his pupils 
that he can teach virtue; he only teaches rhetoric. In 
(pseudo-)Plato’s Greater Hippias 282b4-5, Gorgias of 
Leontini is spoken of as “Gorgias of Leontini, the famous 
sophist” (Gorgias te gar houtos ho Leontinos sophistēs). 
Now let me turn to Ficino: Did he regard Gorgias as a 
sophist? 
 Ficino, in his Gorgias commentary, describes soph-
ists as those who, under the guise of truth, divert men to-
wards what is false.8 Gorgias of Leontini, the portrayed 
speaker in Plato’s Gorgias, did not aim at truth and jus-
tice, but conformed with popular opinion, which prefers 
what has the appearance of truth and likelihood, Ficino 
says.9 In his Phaedrus, Ficino continues, Plato criticised 
Lysias, in the Gorgias he criticised Gorgias of Leontini.10 
Ficino affirms in his Protagoras commentary that Plato 
has Socrates criticising the “sophists” in the dialogue 
Gorgias, though in an elegant manner.11 The sophists re-
ferred to here probably includes Gorgias himself, but pos-
sibly also the two other speakers in the Gorgias, namely 
Polus and Callicles. Callicles, however, may simply have 
been a fictitious character and not a historical person.12 At 
any rate, Gorgias features as a sophist in Plato’s Apology 
19e, and Ficino perceived Gorgias in this manner. For this 
reason, Ficino’s Gorgias commentary is a contribution 
Renaissance debate over ancient sophists. 
 
 
3. The reception of Plato’s Gorgias  
 
I now pass on to the reception of Plato’s Gorgias. The 
dialogue was held in high esteem among late ancient Pla-
tonists, some of whom considered it as a work on political 
virtue.13 Olympiodorus, active in the 6th century, pro-
duced an extensive commentary on the dialogue, emphas-
ising its ethical content. In 1409, Leonardo Bruni (1369-
1444) provided the first complete Latin translation of the 
Gorgias with a preface and annotations.14 Later in the Re-
naissance, still in the fifteenth century, George of Tre-
bizond (1395-1472/1473) and Ficino made important uses 
of the dialogue. In his De laudibus eloquentiae, George of 
Trebizond cited approvingly Gorgias’ definition of rhet-
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oric in Plato’s Gorgias 456c-457c as part of his anti-
Platonism.15 Ficino composed a commentary on the Gor-
gias that took up six folio pages in his 1576 Opera.16 In 
the sixteenth century, Girolamo Cardano wrote a dialogue 
against Plato’s Gorgias, namely his Antigorgias dialogus 
sive de recta vivendi ratione (Anti-Gorgias, or On the 
Right Way to Live), published in 1566.17 Given this ma-
terial, the reception of Plato’s Gorgias in the Renaissance 
is a promising starting point for studying the reception of 
ancient sophistry in the Renaissance and early modern 
period.  
 Ficino, in his 1484 publication of Plato’s collected 
works, did not only write commentaries to Plato’s Gor-
gias, but also to a number of other Plato dialogues that 
were given sophist names, and which presented sophist 
speakers, for instance the dialogues Euthydemus, Pro-
tagoras, Hippias and Critias. In addition, Ficino wrote a 
commentary on Plato’s Sophist, and he dealt with several 
of the ancient sophists included in Diels-Kranz’ 20th-
century list of ancient sophists in these and other dia-
logues.  
 Ficino’s Gorgias commentary is mainly organised 
according to the characters in Plato’s dialogue and their 
respective discussions with Socrates as they unfold within 
the compositional structure. Ficino introduces his com-
mentary by a general distinction between good and bad 
uses of rhetoric and poetry, after which he largely follows 
the composition of the dialogue:18 He sets out reporting 
Socrates’ discussion with Gorgias and his follower Polus 
about the nature of rhetoric, that is, the first part of the 
Gorgias (Gorgias 447a1-481b5).19 It should be noted that 
Plato did not discuss rhetoric in conjunction with poetry 
in his Gorgias — it is Ficino who introduces poetry into 
Plato’s examination of rhetoric in his Gorigas. In the sec-
ond part of Plato’s dialogue (481b6-522e8), Ficino com-
ments on Socrates’ discussion with Callicles about tem-
perance. The final part of Ficino’s commentary is a rather 
independent interpretation of Socrates’ after-life myth, 
which we find in the third part of the Gorgias (523a1-
527e7).20 
 
 
4. Roadmap  
 
In the remaining part of this article I single out a few as-
pects in Ficino’s commentary, where he departs from a 
simple summary of the Gorgias and advances his own 
interpretation or views. In section five I summarise 
Socrates’ and Gorgias’ respective views on rhetoric and 
sophistry in the first part of Plato’s Gorgias (447a1-
481b5), which is discussed in the first and longest part of 
Ficino’s commentary.21 In section six I examine Ficino’s 
analysis of different uses of rhetoric, especially the rhet-
oric employed by Socrates in his refusal of orators and 
sophists. I point out that Ficino draws on Plato’s 
Phaedrus and its theory of rhetoric as a key to understand 
Plato’s own use of rhetoric in his Gorgias. In section 
seven I focus on Ficino’s explicit statements on sophists 
in his Gorgias commentary: Who and what are they, and 
how do Ficino’s identifications fit into his historical con-
text? In section eight I offer a brief account of what I see 
as the second part of Plato’s Gorgias (481b6-527e7), 
where Callicles introduces a new theme, ethics, and I ar-
gue that Socrates’ rejection of rhetoric entails an affirma-
tion of a certain way of living, which Callicles finds prob-
lematic, and a denial of another way of living, linked to 
the mastery of rhetoric, which Callicles defends. Socrates 
argued, against Callicles, that temperance (sōphrosynē) in 
the human soul should lead it to emulate the structure of 
the universe. In section nine I examine Ficino’s commen-
tary to this second part of the Gorgias, arguing that Ficino 
accommodates Plato’s ethico-cosmological agenda to his 
own astronomy and ethical ideas, and that Ficino thereby 
connects his discussion of Callicles to his De vita coelitus 
comparanda and to his Timaeus commentary. 
 
 
5. Plato on orators and sophists (Gorgias 447a1-481b5) 
 
Socrates asks what kind of craft rhetoric is, what it is able 
to accomplish and what it makes claims about and teaches 
(447c1-4). Gorgias defines rhetoric as the art of producing 
persuasion (peithein) by means of speeches (logoi) in the 
following contexts: “judges in a law court, councillors in 
a council meeting, and assemblymen in an assembly or in 
any other political gathering that might take place.” 
(452e14, trans. Zeyl.) Hence Gorgias divides rhetoric ac-
cording to its operative contexts, that is, forensic and po-
litical rhetoric. 
 Socrates argues that if rhetoric is to be regarded as a 
genuine craft (technē), it has to fulfil three requirements: 
(a) a technē must aim at what is best (beltiston) for the 
object processed by the technē. That is, technē is gov-
erned by some sort of teleology (464c3-d3, repeated 
503d5-e5); (b) the craftsman mastering a certain technē is 
able to provide an account or definition (logos) of the na-
ture (physis) of the object pertaining to the technē (465a2-
5). Socrates clarifies that this logos regards the nature and 
the cause of the object (500e4-501a3); (c) the craftsman 
mastering a technē is able to indicate the cause (aitia) de-
termining the state of the object falling under the technē 
in question (465a4-5). Rhetoric does not fulfil these three 
requirements, for which reason it does not qualify as a 
technē. If rhetoric is no craft, then what is rhetoric? It is in 
his answer to this question that Socrates defines the soph-
ist and distinguishes him from the rhetorician. 
 According to Socrates, the opposite to craft (technē) 
is a knack and routine (empeiria kai tribē), producing flat-
tery (kolakeia) and pleasure (hēdonē). Rhetoric and soph-
istry, Socrates continues, both belong to the category of 
flattery. His use of the Greek term kolakeia may allude to 
Eupolis’s comedy named Kolakes (The Flatterers), the 
plural from of the Greek word for a flatterer, kolax — a 
comedy that was staged in 421 BCE and which targeted 
sophists like Protagoras.22 In Plato’s Gorgias, Socrates 
deploys an analogy to explain the difference between 
craft and flattery: In the case of the body, gymnastics 
(technē gymnastkē) and medicine (technē iatrikē) are 
technai for the body, since they provide what is best for 
the body. Reversely, cosmetics and pastry baking are 
forms of kolakeia for the body, since they do not provide 
what is best for the body, but only what gives pleasure. In 
the case of the soul, legislation and justice are technai 
providing what is best for the soul; legislation corres-
ponds to gymnastics, since they both procure what is best, 
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that is, they are prophylactic crafts; similarly, medicine 
corresponds to justice.  
 These two technai of the soul, legislation and justice, 
are opposed to two forms of kolakeia for the soul, namely 
sophistry and rhetoric: Just like the pastry chef, with his 
pleasing dishes, pretends to procure what is best for the 
body and hence to appear more attractive to common 
people than the doctor, who actually knows about medi-
cine and what is best for the body, likewise sophists and 
rhetoricians pretend to procure what is best for the soul 
without offering anything else but pleasure; in the realm 
of politics, sophistry pretends to do this in the context of 
legislation (nomothetikē), rhetoric in the context of justice 
(dikaiosynē). Hence, both sophistry and rhetoric are pleas-
ing, but deceptive. Socrates admits, however, that people 
tend to confuse sophists and rhetoricians, because they 
work in the same field (463a5-465c8).  
 Plato proposed different characterisations of sophists 
in different dialogues, depending on his philosophical ag-
enda, and it would be difficult to reduce his characterisa-
tions to one single formula, e.g. sophists professing false-
hood. In the Gorgias, Socrates’ depiction of sophistry is 
keyed to a forensic and political context, and his criticism 
of sophistry targets the sophists’ aim to flatter (i.e. to pro-
duce kolakeia) rather than to seek was is best for its ob-
ject, the citizens of the polis. What characterises Gorgias’ 
speeches, we are told at the beginning of the dialogue 
(447a-c), is epideixeis, that is, rhetorical show-pieces in-
tended to impress and dazzle his listeners.  Socrates wants 
nothing of it, but insists that Gorgias leaves behind his 
lengthy monologues and commits himself to a dialogue 
structured on questions and answers, that is, dialectics. 
 There is some subtlety involved on Plato’s part. He 
has not Socrates proclaiming that sophists are uttering 
statements which are false and which the sophists them-
selves know are false when they utter them: It may well 
be the case that the statements are false, but not necessa-
rily that the statement-making agents themselves, the 
sophist employing rhetoric at forensic and political con-
texts, know that the statements are false when they utter 
them. Instead, Socrates argues that the sophists’ desire to 
flatter and please an audience, combined with their ignor-
ance about the object of their discourse, enables them to 
affect the beliefs of the audience, but also that these be-
liefs, if put into practice, turn out to be false and poten-
tially disastrous to the audience itself. Of course, it may 
also be the case that the sophist knows that he is uttering 
false statements when he utters flattering and pleasing 
words, which would make the case even more problem-
atic, because of the moral purpose, but this is not the issue 
in the Gorgias: The issue is the desire to flatter and please 
an audience with words, without having real knowledge 
about the object in question. 
 
 
6. Ficino on good and bad uses of rhetoric 
 
In his commentary on the Gorgias, Ficino first summa-
rises Socrates’ position on rhetoric and sophistry, partly 
reported in the previous section.23 However, Ficino is 
eager to avoid what he sees as a potential misunderstand-
ing of Plato, namely that Plato downright rejected rhet-
oric. He did not do so, and Plato himself was very elo-
quent. In order to substantiate these points, Ficino takes 
recourse to Plato’s Phaedrus and its positive evaluation of 
rhetoric. Ficino says as follows in his Gorgias commen-
tary: 
 
But anyone who may think that Plato, by far the most eloquent 
of all, is comparing legitimate rhetoric [eloquentia] to pastry 
baking, must read the Phaedrus, in which he approves of it 
[rhetoric] and speaks of its aim, function and rules in a precise 
manner, claiming that it is similar to medicine [medicina].24 (My 
trans.) 
 
The important word in this quotation is “legitimate”. As 
explained in section one, in Plato’s Gorgias we find 
Socrates claiming that pastry baking is a form of flattery, 
kolakeia, for the body, representing the deceptive nature 
of rhetoric and sophistry. In the Gorgias, pastry baking is 
not regarded as a technē, but as an empeiria, a knack. In 
the above quotation from Ficino’s Gorgias commentary, 
however, Ficino juxtaposes this negative view of rhetoric 
with the positive view of rhetoric found in the Phaedrus, 
where, so Ficino points out, legitimate rhetoric is com-
pared not with pastry baking, but with medicine (medi-
cina). In Plato’s Gorgias, medicine, in Greek, technē 
iatrikē, is regarded as a genuine craft, namely a craft 
whose object is the body’s health and care. Clearly, Fi-
cino refers to this reverse evaluation of rhetoric in the 
Phaedrus, partly in order to give a fuller interpretation of 
Plato’s view on rhetoric, partly in order to justify the fact 
that Plato, though critical of rhetoric, valued rhetoric and 
was very eloquent himself.  
 What does Plato say about rhetoric in his Phaedrus, 
and can Plato’s eloquence be defended on this score, as 
Ficino thinks? I shall leave out the last question, since it is 
too broad, but I shall address the first. In his Phaedrus 
266b-272b, rhetoric is compared with medicine, and 
Socrates states explicitly in 270b1-2 that the craft of rhet-
oric is very much like that of medicine (technē iatrikē).25 
Compared with Plato’s Gorgias, this is a notable state-
ment, because in that dialogue Socrates had denied that 
rhetoric was anything but knack and routine (empeiria kai 
tribē) and he had denied that it was a technē.  
 Admittedly, in the Phaedrus, Socrates repeats the ac-
cusation that rhetoric is nothing but knack and routine 
(270b1-9), but he adds that rhetoric may qualify as a craft, 
if and only if, it fulfils three requirements. The good ora-
tor must: (1) possess knowledge about the nature (physis) 
of the object under discussion; (2) prescribe a certain ac-
tion to be carried out and towards what or whom it is di-
rected; (3) possess adequate taxonomies of the audience’s 
souls and of the different kinds of speeches. Besides, he 
will know when to deploy a certain kind of speech when 
facing a certain kind of audience in order to produce the 
desired effects (271a4-271b5). The overall function of 
rhetorical speeches, thus understood, is to lead souls to 
persuasion (psychagōgia), Socrates adds (271c10-d2).  
 These three requirements to rhetoric as a craft, stated 
in the Phaedrus, largely correspond to the requirements to 
any craft laid down by Socrates in the Gorgias, as re-
ported above. His second requirement in the Gorgias re-
gards the orator’s ability to provide an account of the na-
ture (physis) of the object considered; this requirement 
corresponds to the first requirement in the Phaedrus. His 
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third requirement in the Gorgias regards the orator’s 
knowledge about causal connections pertaining to the ob-
ject discussed; this requirement corresponds to the third 
requirement in the Phaedrus. Socrates’ comparison of 
rhetoric with medicine in the Phaedrus is premised on the 
assumption that the doctor too must know the nature of 
the body and the causes leading to health and disease 
(270c3-5). 
 An orator and politician like Pericles, Socrates con-
tinues in the Phaedrus, qualified as such a speaker, be-
cause he had knowledge about the nature, the physis, of 
his object, that is, the Athenians (270a3-8). The problem 
with those who now write treatises on rhetoric, Socrates 
continues, is that they conceal the nature of their object, 
the human soul, even though they know it well; until they 
bring out this knowledge in the open and conform with 
the requirements mentioned by Socrates, they do not 
comply with the precepts of a genuine craft (271c1-4). 
 When Ficino, in the above quotation from his Gor-
gias commentary, brings forth Plato’s claim in the 
Phaedrus that rhetoric may qualify as a craft, he does so 
in order to give a broader and more comprehensive ac-
count of Plato’s stance towards rhetoric, as mentioned al-
ready, but he also does so in order to justify Plato’s elo-
quence: Plato is eloquent, that is true, but his eloquence is 
supported by a solid knowledge of the nature of his ob-
ject, the human soul, and he discloses this knowledge in 
an open and truthful manner.  
 Relying on the Phaedrus as a key to understand the 
examination of rhetoric in the Gorgias, Ficino explains 
rhetoric and its parts as follows in his Gorgias commen-
tary: 
 
In order to understand clearly what follows, it should be noted 
that rhetoric may be considered either in its genus or in its spe-
cies. In its genus it is defined as a diligence that is indeed ready 
to produce persuasion in civic matters, either by means of a 
critical skill or by means of a high degree of eloquence. For this 
reason rhetoric has been founded as the craft of speaking and the 
craft of poetry. Considered so far, rhetoric is good for the intel-
lect [intellectus]; to the will [voluntas] however, it is neither 
good nor evil. 
 There are two species of rhetoric. One is philosophical, the 
other is agreeable to the common people [popularis] or flattering 
[adulatoria]; the first is good, the second bad. The aim of the 
first is to lead the audience to a common good by stating the rea-
sons of things, words and moral traditions. This species of rhet-
oric he praises as the highest in the Phaedrus, and it is derived 
from philosophy and serious poetry. The aim of the second spe-
cies of rhetoric is to succeed, in whatever way it fancies, in ob-
taining agreement through plausible conjectures and excitements 
of the souls in a crowd. We place this form of rhetoric between 
sophistry and popular poetry, since it is a mixture of these two, 
which he denounces in this dialogue.26 (My trans.) 
 
The division of rhetoric into two species in the second 
paragraph may well refer to Plato’s distinction in the 
Phaedrus between two kinds of rhetoric, one that fulfils 
Socrates’ requirements to rhetoric (dubbed the ‘philo-
sophical’ in the Gorgias commentary), and one that does 
not fulfil these requirements, but which may still be 
agreeable and flattering to the audience; the Latin adjec-
tive adulatoria picking up on the Greek noun kolakeia. 
 In the first paragraph of the above quotation, we find 
the following sentence: “rhetoric is good for the intellect 
[intellectus]; to the will [voluntas] however, it is neither 
good nor evil.” The dichotomy between the concepts 
‘will’ and ‘intellect’ is not advanced in Plato’s Gorgias or 
in his Phaedrus — it is Ficino’s own addition. It may feed 
into the late Medieval discussion of intellectualism and 
voluntarism, to which Ficino contributed by means of his 
Symposium commentary, Da amore: If the individual hu-
man soul is to have a unificative experience with the di-
vine, the human intellect is insufficient in itself, it needs 
the will as well. The will, in turn, is to be understood as 
the human soul’s amor, its love, which is moved by 
beauty. 
 
 
7. Ficino on sophists and philosophers 
 
In my last quotation we saw Ficino divide rhetoric into 
two, one philosophical and one “agreeable to the common 
people (popularis) or flattering (adulatoria)”.  The latter 
he placed between sophistry and popular poetry. This 
predominantly negative view of sophistry occurs else-
where in his Gorgias commentary. At the very beginning, 
Ficino proclaims that there are two great powers in the 
human soul, namely cognition (cognitio) and affection 
(affectus), of which the “sophists, under the guise of truth, 
turn [the crowd’s] cognition towards what is false.”27 
Hence Plato condemns sophists completely, Ficino 
notes.28 Poetry, which sophistry resembles, as we have 
just seen, is not condemned in the same absolute manner: 
Popular poetry agitates the affections and as such it may 
pose a danger to youngsters who are led by emotions and 
ignorant of the allegorical meaning in poetry. For this rea-
son, Ficino continues, Plato condemns popular poetry 
from the city (urbs), referring to the Republic for this 
view.29  
 In his Gorgias commentary, however, Ficino makes 
the following general statement about sophists and phi-
losophers: 
 
Understand that the [charges] which Callicles raises against phi-
losophers [i.e. Gorgias 484c-486d] do not target genuine philo-
sophes, but [a] partly the most sluggish of the sophists, and 
partly those [b] who misuse the study of philosophy when they 
pursue logic alone, thereby by-passing the other areas of specu-
lation; or [c] when they attach themselves to speculation alone, 
thus ignoring the philosophical precepts of tradition and the 
civic institutions.30 (My trans.) 
 
It is hard not to read this statement as Ficino’s comment 
on Plato’s Gorgias as well as on contemporary philoso-
phers, especially scholastic philosophers. In Plato’s Gori-
gas 484c-486d, which Ficino probably comments upon by 
these words, we find no explicit references to philoso-
phers pursing logic alone, i.e. [b], which would indeed be 
hard to find at that time, given that logic was only devel-
oped after Plato, namely by Aristotle. Those philosophers 
charged by Callicles in Plato’s Gorgias 484c-486d are not 
boys or youngsters taking an interest in philosophy as part 
of their education, but those men who persevere and study 
philosophy well into their adulthood, and who loose the 
skill to make persuasive speeches in political assemblies 
and court rooms. Socrates is one case in point, and Calli-
cles scorns him and encourages him to abandon his inter-
est in philosophy. 
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To whom, then, may Ficino refer by the two groups [b] 
and [c]? Group [b] may refer to scholastic philosophers in 
general. In the fourteenth century, one of the founders of 
humanism, Petrarch, had identified dialecticians at the 
University of Oxford as sophists, and Ficino may allude 
to this wide-spread humanist criticism of scholastic phi-
losophers dedicating themselves to logic exclusively.31 
Group [c] may partly refer to the same group, but it may 
also refer to scholastic philosophers working within natu-
ral philosophy and metaphysics, thus ignoring ethics and 
political philosophy, areas that were part of and ancient 
philosophy and dear to Renaissance humanists. 
 
 
8. Plato’s Callicles: desire and greed (Gorgias 481b6-
527e7) 
 
In the second and third part of Plato’s Gorgias (i.e. 
481b6-527e7), Callicles enters the scene and changes the 
theme from rhetoric to ethics; Callicles objects that 
Socrates’ rejection of rhetoric entails an ethical ideal 
about a certain way of living, which Callicles contests.  
 According to Callicles’ theory of natural law, the 
stronger is allowed by nature (physis) to have a greater 
share than the weaker and to exert his power over the 
weaker (488b-491c). Callicles develops his ethical view 
by adding a theory of hedonism, supporting his theory of 
natural law. According to nature, happiness consists in the 
fulfilling of one’s desires (epithymiai). Self-control 
(sōphrosynē), on the other hand, is a hindrance to this 
aim. However, the majority of people is impotent and un-
able to pursue the kind of happiness prescribed by nature, 
for which reason they perversely praise self-control as an 
ideal. The truth is, Callicles triumphs, that a lack of self-
discipline (akolasia) is an ethical ideal according to na-
ture (491d-494a). Socrates disagrees with Callicles, and 
he argues that the soul able to experience happiness is a 
soul characterised by self-control, allowing it to curb its 
desires (epithymiai), and that this idea is reflected in the 
order of the universe. 
 
 
9. Ficino against Callicles: the ethical ideal of the self-
controlled soul 
 
Ficino, in his Gorgias commentary, seems to misrepresent 
Callicles’ theory of natural law, since he attributes to Cal-
licles, and to Thrasymachus (a noted sophist, depicted in 
Plato’s Republic) “and many others” the view that cus-
toms and laws are not based on the order of nature 
(naturae ordo), but on men’s opinion (opinio) and imagi-
nation (ficitio).32 This view was, perhaps, more typical of 
an early Greek sophist like Antiphon than of Plato’s char-
acter Callicles; Antiphon had stated a conflict between 
laws (nomoi) and nature (physis), whereas Callicles in 
Plato’s Gorgias claimed that laws ought to conform with 
nature, though he admitted that present-day democratic 
Athens did not do so.33 However, Callicles did in fact 
base his concept of justice on his notion of nature.34 It 
seems to me that this is one example of Ficino lumping 
together some early Greek thinkers into one single group 
entitled sophists, which was in fact a quite diverse group 
of thinkers. 
These are Ficino’s words on Socrates’ reply to Calli-
cles, who scorned the value of self-control: 
 
Socrates, however, girds up his loins to prove that self-control is 
not founded on human opinion, but on the order of nature. In 
fact, the natural order requires that the lower parts of the soul 
obey the higher parts and the whole soul is in harmony with it-
self in all respects, and that it is beautiful and does not act ran-
domly, but pursues the proper aim. This is the moral disposition 
and life of the self-controlled human being. In the human being 
lacking self-control, on the other hand, reason [ratio], the queen 
of the human being, caters for servile lust, and [such a human 
being, or its reason] is marked by disturbance and weakness, 
struggling in its endeavour to fulfil, always pursuing fleeting 
pleasure [voluptas], despite incomparable trouble. 
All this Socrates explains by means of the views of the Py-
thagoreans, especially Philolaus and Empedocles, using the two-
fold method of fable [fabula] and example [exemplum], in which 
it is being discussed whether the soul within the body is entirely 
dead: The soul lacking self-control being condemned to the 
lower [world], where it is miserably inflicted by vain and relent-
less toil, as it continuously struggles with the leaky jar, that is, 
depraved and false judgement, to refill the other jar, that is, insa-
tiable desire [concupiscentia], with the water of delights [oblec-
tamenti].35 (My trans.) 
 
In the first paragraph, Ficino argues that Socrates bases 
his argument on the value of self-control on the order of 
nature. In the Gorgias, Socrates does so in his rejection of 
Callicles — for instance, in his famous cosmological pas-
sage (507e3-508a8), where he argues that there is an an-
alogy between the parts of the human soul and the parts of 
the universe. At the end of his commentary, Ficino spells 
out a cosmological order, which does not appear in 
Plato’s Gorgias, but which introduces the familiar Fi-
cinian cosmology with the planets Saturn ruling over 
Jupiter, Nepturn and Pluto, thereby engrafting a universal 
law into the order of nature.36 Ficino’s elaboration of the 
cosmological element connects his Gorgias commentary 
to some of his other works on natural philosophy, in par-
ticular his De vita coelitus comparanda and his Timaeus 
commentary. Here too, the human soul is part of a cosmic 
order, and its ethical value is largely determined by its 
conformity with this order. 
 In the second paragraph of the last quotation, Ficino 
refers to the two images of the water carriers and the 
leaky jars in the Gorgias 492e-494a, illustrating Socrates’ 
theory of the undisciplined soul, illustrating Callicles’ 
ethical ideal.37 Plato himself did not reveal his sources to 
these images, but Ficino clearly hold that Plato is drawing 
on Pythagorean ideas, especially those advanced by 
Philolaus and Empedocles.38 In Diogenes Laertius’ Lives 
8.33, however, Pythagoras is attributed the following 
view, which may play a role in the first paragraph of the 
above quotation: “Virtue [aretēn] is harmony [har-
monian], and so are health [hygieian] and all good 
[agathon] and God himself; this is why they say that all 
things are constructed according to the laws of harmony 
[kath’ harmonian synestanai ta hola]. The love of friends 
is just concord [isotēta] and harmony [enarmonion].” 
This passage does not mention Philolaus and Empedocles, 
but it does affirm that the theory of the soul’s harmony 
was central to Pythagoreans. 
 The upshot is, however, that in the eyes of Ficino, 
sophists like Callicles, Thrasymachus and many others 
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were up against the Platonic-Pythagorean ethical ideal, 
and that the sophists were terribly wrong.  
 
 
Concluding remark 
 
There is no doubt that Ficino’s Gorgias commentary 
played a significant role in the reception of ancient soph-
istry. As my brief account of Ficino’s commentary on 
Plato’s Gorgias makes clear, sophists not only discussed 
the nature and legitimacy of rhetoric, they also discussed 
ethics and political theories, e.g. Callicles in the Gorgias. 
Ficino was sensitive to this dimension of sophistry and 
responded to it. I tend to think that he got Callicles’ po-
litical theory wrong, as mentioned earlier, but that is less 
important in this context: The important point is that an-
cient sophists were perceived by a Renaissance thinker 
like Ficino as having views outside the realm of rhetoric, 
in this case political theory, natural law theories in par-
ticular.  
 This opens up for another line of research: Did the 
Renaissance introduction of ancient sophistry have any 
impact on political theories in the early modern period? 
Perhaps the answer is a blunt ‘no’, partly because Aris-
totle’s account of sophistry (falseness presented as truth) 
was more influential than Plato’s intricate discussion in 
his sophist dialogues, partly because ancient sophists 
were perceived as having outrageous views that were not 
taken seriously by political thinkers in the early modern 
period. To me, however, it remains an open question. 
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1 For Critias in Plato’s dialogues, see Nails 2002, 106-111. 
2  For Gorgias of Leontini and his impact in Athens, see ibid. 157. 
3  For instance, Aristotle, Topics VIII 162a12-18; Sophistical Refutations 
1 165a22, 11 171b27-34, 34 183a37-183b6; Metaphysics III.2 996a32-
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996b1, IV.2 1004b17-26, VI.2 1026b15, VII.6 1032a6-7, IX.8 1049b33; 
Nicomachean Ethics IX.1 1164a30-35, X.9 1180b35-1181a13; Politics 
V.5 1307b36; Rhetoric I.1 1355b20, III.2 1404b38, III.18 1419a14. For 
the reception of Aristotle’s works, see Steenberghen 1955. 
4  Anzulewicz 2002, 222.  
5  For the reception of Laertius’ Lives, see Gigante 1988; Tolomio 1933. 
Laertius’ Lives not only served as a source of information about ancient 
thinkers — it also served as a model of narrating philosophy’s past. For 
this theme, see Baker 2017. 
6  These and related questions have been addressed in Guthrie 1969; 
Jarratt 1991; Vegetti 1999; Lloyd 2002. 
7  Diels and Kranz 1951-1952, vol. 2, section C, ‘Ältere Sophistik’, 252-
416. 
8  Ficino, In Gorgiam, 1315.1-4. 
9  Ibid. 1315.19-20. 
10  Ibid. 1315.25-29. 
11  Ficino, In Protagoram, 1297.14-16: “Idem in Gorgia elegantissime. 
Facere admondum et urbane in Hippia. Scite et argute in Euthydemo. 
Artificiose etiam in Protaogra, saepeque similiter.” I owe this observa-
tion to MacPhail 2011, 47. For Protagoras in the Renaissance, see Trin-
kaus 1976. 
12  See Dodds 1959, 12-15. For a discussion of the political forms of rule 
represented by Callicles, see Kerferd 1974. 
13  [Anonymous]. Prolégomènes a la philosophie de Platon, §26. 
14  For Bruni’s translation, see Hankins 1990, 53-57, 394-396. 
15  For George of Trebizond’s uses of Plato’s Gorgias, see Monfasani 
1976, 242-243, 258-259; Hankins 1990, 169-170. 
16  For Ficino’s Gorgias commentary, see Allen 1998, 996-107, 111; 
MacPhail 2011, 13, 21, 39-40; Katinis 2013, 53-55. For Ficino’s com-
mentary on Plato’s Sophist, which is also relevant to his Gorgias com-
mentary, see Ficino, In Sophistam and Allen 1989. 
17  For Cardano’s use of Plato’s Gorgias, see Giglioni 2012, 176, 186-
191. 
18  Ficino, In Gorgiam, 1315.1-30. 
19  Ibid. 1315.30-1320.18. 
20  Ibid. 1320.18-1320.46. 
21  Ibid. 1315.1-1318.6. 
22  I owe this reference to Nightingale 1995, 186. 
23  Ficino, In Gorgiam, 1316.48-1317.7. For rhetoric in the Renaissance, 
see Vickers 1988. 
24  Ficino, In Gorgiam, 1317.9-12: “Sed nequis existimet Platonem longe 
omnium eloquentissimum legitimam eloquentiam coquinariae compare-
re, legat Phaedrum, in quo et eam probat, et finem officiumque et prae-
cepta eius subtilissime tradit, asserit que ipsam esse similem medicinae.” 
25  The noun iatrikē mentioned in Plato’s Phaedrus 268a-b, 268c. 
26  Ficino, In Gorgiam, 1316.37-48: “Caeterum ut quae sequuntur, plane 
intelligantur, advertendum est, oratoriam vel in genere, vel in speciebus, 
posse considerari, atque in genere quidem definiri, industriam ad per-
suadendum in materia civili promptissimam, tum quadam probationis 
facultate, tum vel maxime eloquii gratia. Ideoque inter artem quandam 
disserendi, poeticamque esse quodammodo constitutam. Hactenus orato-
rioa intellectui quidem bonum est, voluntati vero neque bonum est, ne-
que malum.  
  Huius autem duae sunt species, philosophica et popularis, sive adulato-
ria, illa bonum, haec vero malum. Illius quidem finis est, certis rerum, 
verborum, morum rationibus, audientes ad commune bonum perducere. 
Quam maxime laudat in Phaedro ex philosophiae poesique graviori 
compositam. Alterius autem finis est, per coniecturas turabae verisimi-
les, concitationesque animorum, quodcunque libuerit impetrare. Hanc 
inter sophisticam vulgaremque poesim ponimus, ex utrisque permixtam, 
quam in hoc dialogo detestatur.”   
27  Ficino, In Gorgiam, 1315.1-2: “Cum due quaedam in animo potissi-
ma sint, cognitio et affectus, conitiionem quidem sophista sub veritatis 
specie ad falsa detorquent.” 
28  Ibid. 1315.5-9. 
29  Ibid. 1315.4-15. For Ficino on the popular poets, see Allen 1998, 93-
123, 213-217, especially 96-107, 111, which discusses Ficino’s views on 
poets in his Gorgias commentary. 
30  Ficino, In Gorgiam, 1318.9-15: “Quod vero afferre videntur Callicles 
contra philosophos, intellige non contra legitimos philosophos esse dic-
ta, sed partim adversus ignavissimos sophistarum, partim adversus eos, 
qui philosophiae studio abutuntur, dum vel ita solam logicam sectantur, 
ut partes speculationis alias deserant, vel ita solam speculationem capes-
sunt, ut philosopihca morum praecepta instituta que civilia negligant.” 
31  Vasoli 1968, 11-39. For instance, Ficino 1990, 100, 176, characterises 
Aristotelian philosophers as “vain sophists” (sophistae leviculi). 
32  Ficino, In Gorgiam, 1318.6-8. 
33  For Antiphon, [Fragments], 812.  
 
 
34  For Callicles’ notion of justice based nature, see Plato, Gorgias 481b-
484c. 
35 Ficino, In Gorgiam, 1318.40-53: “Socrates autem mox ad demon-
strandum sese accingit, temperantiam non opinione humana, sed ordine 
naturae constare. Profecto naturalis ordo requirit, ut inferiores animae 
partes superioribus pareant, totusque animus consonans undique sit et 
pulcher, neque agat frustra, sed finem propositum consequatur, qualis 
est habitus vita que temperati. Contra vero in homine intemperato ratio 
regina homnis servili servit concupiscentiae, dissonat quoque et languet, 
opusque in explebile molitur, incomparabilique molestia volantem se-
quitur voluptatem.” 
  Id totum Socrates Pythagoraeorum praesertim Philolai et Empedoclis 
sententiis explicat, duplici praecipue via, scilicet per fabulam et exem-
plum, in quibus ipse considera, animam in hoc corpore omnem quidem 
esse mortuam, intemperantem praeterea inferis deputari, irrito asiduoque 
labore miserbiliter agitatam, dum quodam perforato vase, id est, depra-
vato fallicique iudicio continue machinatur perforatum quoque vas alte-
rum, id est, concupiscentiam inexplebilem fluentibus oblectamentis im-
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37  For a discussion of this passage in Plato, see Carone 2004. 
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